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Watching Out for the Watchdogs:  





 On May 15, 2006, Joel S. Lippman, M.D., was fired because—if his allegations are to be 
believed—he had faithfully executed his responsibilities.1  For over fifteen years, Dr. Lippman 
worked in the fields of pharmaceutical and medical device manufacture in various directorial and 
executive capacities.2  In 2000, Dr. Lippman began working for Ethicon, a manufacturer of medical 
devices used in surgical procedures, where he served first as vice president of medical affairs and 
then, later, as the worldwide vice president of medical affairs and the company’s chief medical 
officer.3  Dr. Lippman’s job duties were expansive and required him to serve on a number of 
internal review boards, providing his medical opinions and expertise on the safety of medical 
devices as well as their compliance with pertinent federal and state laws and regulations.4  One of 
these review boards, known as the quality board, had significant power over the distribution of 
Ethicon’s medical devices, wielding the “final say” over whether any corrective actions were to 
be taken with regard to any of the products.5  
As the chief medical officer, Dr. Lippman’s urged the quality board to exercise caution and 
restraint, recommending on numerous occasions that Ethicon refrain from beginning or continuing 
to market different products which Dr. Lippman deemed medically unsafe.6  Some of the other 
members of the quality board were driven by competing motivations, representing the business 
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1 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 119 A.3d 215, 218–19 (N.J. 2015). 
2 Id. at 218. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. at 219. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
side of the company, and accordingly disagreed with and pushed back against Dr. Lippman’s 
suggestions.7  Dr. Lippman relied on his medical expertise, his many years of experience in the 
field, and his understanding of the laws governing Ethicon’s various products.8  He believed that 
it was his responsibility to “candidly and forthrightly express his opinions and concerns about the 
safety of a product.”9  Shortly before his termination, Dr. Lippman engaged in another of these 
quality board reviews, urging his colleagues that a product referred to as DFK-24 should be 
recalled.10  In his opinion, the product was dangerous.11  Although other members of the board 
were resistant, Ethicon ultimately followed Dr. Lippman’s suggestion and recalled the product in 
either late April or early May 2006.12  Within a couple of weeks of the recall, on May 15, 2006, 
Dr. Lippman’s employment was terminated.13 
 In 2006, Sherilyn McCoy served as the Ethicon’s company group chairperson and was Dr. 
Lippman’s direct superior and the person to whom he reported.14  According to McCoy, Dr. 
Lippman was terminated because of an allegedly inappropriate romantic relationship that he had 
engaged in with a female subordinate, though one who did not report directly to Dr. Lippman.15  
Ms. McCoy acknowledged that this justification was not one which, to her knowledge, had ever 
been used to terminate or even discipline an Ethicon employee before.16  Ms. McCoy also stated 
that she was unaware of any written policy prohibiting that type of consensual romantic 
                                                 
7 Lippman, 119 A.3d at 219. 
8 Id. at 218. 
9 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 75 A.3d 432, 439 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
10 Lippman, 119 A.3d at 219. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. (There was some disagreement in the record over when the recall occurred; the court stated “Ethicon 
eventually did so in late April or early May 2006.”). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 219. 
16 Lippman, 119 A.3d at 219. 
relationship.17  Dr. Lippman contends that the purported rationale for his firing was illusory and 
that Ethicon’s true motivation was to remove what they had come to view as an obstacle standing 
between the company and greater profitability.18 
 Whether or not Dr. Lippman was removed in retaliation for his good faith efforts to alert 
his employer to the risks its products posed to society at large is open for debate.  The factual 
record has not been fully developed and the case has yet to be resolved.19  What should not be 
debatable, however, is that people in Dr. Lippman’s position—watchdog employees—must be 
protected by laws intended to encourage employees to take action when they see their employers 
violating laws or putting the public in danger.  In Lippman v. Ethicon, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court found this to be the case.20 
 This Comment will examine how various states have addressed the question of whether or 
not watchdog employees should be afforded whistleblower protections.  Part II will examine the 
whistleblower protection statute in New Jersey and how it was applied in Lippman.  Part III will 
look at how some other states have reached the opposite result from New Jersey in interpreting 
their own whistleblower protection statutes.  Part IV will look at some further states that have 
interpreted their whistleblower protection statutes in line with New Jersey. Part V will study how 
the federal government has addressed the problem, and how its treatment of this issue has evolved 
over time.  Part VI addresses the job duties exception to free speech protection for federal 
employees, as well as the thorny issues raised by the attorney whistleblower.  Finally, Part VII will 
conclude and recommend what the states currently in opposition to New Jersey’s approach should 
do going forward.  In total, this Comment will argue that failing to afford whistleblower protection 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 75 A.3d 432, 405–06 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
19 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 119 A.3d 215, 231 (N.J. 2015). 
20 Id. at 230–31. 
to watchdog employees is plainly contrary to the public policy rationales underlying whistleblower 
protection legislation. 
II. Whistleblower Protection in New Jersey 
 A. Conscientious Employee Protection Act 
The New Jersey Supreme Court first addressed whistleblower protection in the 1980 case 
of Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.21  In that case, the court engaged in a discussion of the 
development of a common law cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee 
in situations which constituted a clear violation of public policy.22  Though the plaintiff in that case 
was ultimately unsuccessful, the court explicitly endorsed the approach.23  In 1986, the New Jersey 
state legislature directly codified this decision in the passage of the Conscientious Employee 
Protection Act (CEPA).24  The statute, in pertinent part, provides:  
An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an 
employee because the employee does any of the following: 
a. Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public 
body an activity, policy or practice of the employer or another 
employer, with whom there is a business relationship, that the 
employee reasonably believes: 
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated 
pursuant to law, including any violation involving deception of, or 
misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient, 
customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the 
employer or any governmental entity, or, in the case of an employee 
who is a licensed or certified health care professional, reasonably 
believes constitutes improper quality of patient care;  
(2) is fraudulent or criminal, including any activity, policy or 
practice of deception or misrepresentation which the employee 
reasonably believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client, 
patient, customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner 
of the employer or any governmental entity; 
b. Provides information to, or testifies before, any public body 
conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any violation of 
                                                 
21 Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980). 
22 Id. at 508–11. 
23 Id. at 512–13. 
24 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19 (West 2016). 
law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law by the 
employer or another employer, with whom there is a business 
relationship,  or, in the case of an employee who is a licensed or 
certified health care professional, provides information to, or 
testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation, 
hearing or inquiry into the quality of patient care; or 
c. Objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or 
practice which the employee reasonably believes: 
(1) is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated 
pursuant to law, including any violation involving deception of, or 
misrepresentation to, any shareholder, investor, client, patient, 
customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the 
employer or any governmental entity, or, if the employee is a 
licensed or certified health care professional, constitutes improper 
quality of patient care; 
(2) is fraudulent or criminal including any activity, policy or practice 
of deception or misrepresentation which the employee reasonably 
believes may defraud any shareholder, investor, client, patient, 
customer, employee, former employee, retiree or pensioner of the 
employer or any governmental entity; or 
(3) is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning 
the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the 
environment.25 
 
This provision of CEPA, known as “Employer retaliatory action; protected employee actions,” 
provides protection for employees who attempt to enforce mandates, either of public policy or 
those expressly created by judicial decision or statute.26 
 CEPA is an example of what has come to be known as a whistleblower statute.27  
Whistleblower statutes fall under a category of legislation known as remedial legislation, laws 
intended to provide a remedy for plaintiffs who have suffered what society views as an injustice.28  
In order to bring about the important social goals of remedial legislation, courts must construe 
remedial laws in as liberal a way as their words allow, to give the legislation as broad an effect as 
                                                 
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2006). 
26 See Carolyn Dellatore, Blowing the Whistle on CEPA: Why New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act 
Has Gone Too Far, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 375, 383–84 (2008) (describing the goals of CEPA). 
27 See Christopher P. Lenzo, The Changing Contours of New Jersey Whistleblower Law, 196 N.J. LAW., Apr. 1999, 
at 51 (describing CEPA as a whistleblower statute). 
28 Abbamont v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 650 A.2d 958, 971 (N.J. 1994). 
possible.29  Accordingly, any time an employee speaks up about workplace conditions or practices 
that are either unsafe or unlawful, courts should strive to interpret whistleblower statutes like 
CEPA to provide the employee with protection from retaliatory action by the employer.30 
 In order to prove a claim under CEPA, the plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of four 
factors connected with the termination:  
(1) that he . . . reasonably believed that his . . . employer's conduct 
was violating either a law or a rule or regulation promulgated 
pursuant to law; (2) that he . . . performed whistle-blowing activity 
described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3a, c(1) or c(2); (3) an adverse 
employment action was taken against him . . . ; and (4) a causal 
connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the 
adverse employment action.31   
 
Under this standard, an employee can receive protection, even if the conduct he objected to was 
not unlawful.32  However, it must have been reasonable to believe that the conduct violated some 
law or regulation, and the employee must have actually believed as such.33  In this narrow way, 
the employee’s purpose in blowing the whistle should be considered. 
  B.  Application of CEPA to Watchdog Employees in Lippman 
 Against this backdrop, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether CEPA’s 
protection was meant to be extended to so-called watchdog employees.34  A watchdog employee 
is an employee whose job duties and responsibilities explicitly require them to regularly engage in 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 20 A.3d 384, 391 (N.J. 2011).  See also, Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector 
Whistleblowing and the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 
S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 587–88 (2004) (outlining the argument that whistleblower statutes are remedial statutes and 
that they should be “broadly interpreted” as a result). 
31 Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, Inc., 100 A.3d 191, 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014), cert. granted, 108 A.3d 633 (N.J. 
2015) (citation omitted). 
32 See Dellatore, supra note 26, at 384.  
33 Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 828 A.2d 893, 900 (N.J. 2003) (“A plaintiff who brings a claim pursuant to [CEPA] need 
not show that his or her employer or another employee actually violated the law or a clear mandate of public policy . 
. . the plaintiff must simply show that he or she ‘reasonably believes’ that to be the case.”) (citations omitted). 
34 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 119 A.3d 215, 226–28 (N.J. 2015). 
the type of activity that whistleblower statutes seek to encourage.35  If your job requires you to 
engage in behavior that would otherwise constitute whistleblowing, you are a watchdog 
employee.36  Some common types of watchdog employees include compliance officers, 
ombudsmen,37 in-house council, internal auditors,38 and, broadly, many individuals involved in 
the medical field.39  This last category is perhaps the most significant, as it pertains directly to the 
health, safety, and well-being of individuals and our society at large.40  It was in this category that 
Dr. Lippman found himself. 
 In determining whether or not Dr. Lippman and watchdog employees in general fall within 
CEPA’s protection, the court analyzed the language of the statute, specifically the use of the 
language “an employee.”41  The court noted that employee was defined within CEPA as “any 
individual who performs services for and under the control and direction of an employer for wages 
or other remuneration.”42  In addition to this clear definition, and the absence of any type of 
                                                 
35 See Employment Litigation, 27 BUS. TORTS. REP. 257, 257-60 (2015) (discussing the Lippman decision and 
describing watchdog employees as “employees fulfilling ‘watchdog’ duties at the behest of their employer”). 
36 See David B. Lichtenberg & David J. Treibman, Did I Blow the Right Whistle? The Evolving Definition of a 
Whistleblower under New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), 291 N.J. LAW., Dec. 2014, at 
54, 58 (describing watchdog employees as those who, “in light of his or her duties and responsibilities” is in a 
position to know when an employer’s conduct is contrary to law or public policy). 
37 See, e.g., Erin Daly, Garcetti in Delaware: New Limits on Public Employees’ Speech, 11 DEL. L. REV. 23, 38 
(2009) (noting that “employees like ombudsmen and compliance officers” are required by their jobs “to rout out 
wrongdoing and internal violations”). 
38 See, e.g., Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-
Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 505–06 (2012) (explaining that “certain individuals” had a 
“job function . . . to detect or investigate” violations of the law, “such as legal counsel, auditors, and internal 
compliance personnel.”). 
39 See, e.g., Jennifer S. Bard, What to Do When You Can’t Hear the Whistleblowing, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 51–
52 (2012) (“Many have suggested that the very nature of scientific research . . . imposes an obligation on scientists 
to be whistleblowers . . . .”); Frank J. Cavico & Nancy M. Cavico, Employment-at-Will, Public Policy, and the 
Nursing Profession, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 161 (2005) (discussing the profession of nursing and how the 
members of the profession face ethical and professional responsibilities to report misconduct). See also Herbert G. 
Ogden, The Public Policy Exception to At-Will Employment, 34 VT. B.J., Fall 2008, at 44, 45–47 (discussing that in 
some jurisdictions, a doctor’s ethical code could serve as the important source of public policy needed to receive 
whistleblower protection). 
40 See Cavico, supra note 39, at 238 (arguing that courts should take an expansive view of the public policy 
exception as it applies to employees whose jobs impact the “superseding societal interest in effective and excellent 
health care”). 
41 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 119 A.3d 215, 225 (N.J. 2015). 
42 Id. 
limiting language, the court also acknowledged that remedial legislation such as CEPA must be 
liberally construed.43  Taking these considerations together, and noting the total absence of any 
evidence within the statute to the contrary, the court found that any construction of CEPA that 
would limit its application to any subset of “employees” would be contrary to legislative intent 
and invalid.44  As such, the court found that watchdog employees were entitled to whistleblower 
protection, on the same terms as all other employees.45 
 C.  The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Failure to Enunciate a Public Policy Rationale 
 While this opinion certainly stands as a victory for watchdog employees and a vindication 
of legislative purpose and intent, the New Jersey Supreme Court could have taken this opportunity 
to go further, vehemently emphasizing the public policy rationale which supported the decision.  
As the lower court found in its separate published opinion, watchdog employees are not merely 
within the protections offered by CEPA, they are precisely the sort of employee who need the 
protection the most.46  Their jobs require them to regularly, and in some cases constantly, make 
reports or findings to their employers that cut against the employer’s financial interests.  It is easy 
to see why the appeals court described these employees as “most vulnerable to retaliation.”47  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s failure to explicitly endorse this view is not an infirmity to the 
decision.  The statutory construction argument on which the court relied was simple, seemingly 
self-evident, and entirely conclusive on the issue.  No New Jersey court will have any difficulty 
applying the rule set forth in the decision.  However, by not making the policy argument, the 
decision loses some of its potential instructive force. 
                                                 
43 Id.; see also supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
44 Lippman, 119 A.3d at 227 (“There is simply no support in CEPA’s definition of ‘employee’ to restrict the Act’s 
application and preclude its protection of watchdog employees.”). 
45 Id. 
46 Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 75 A.3d 432, 449 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
47 Id. 
 CEPA is not unique.  Many states have whistleblower statutes that—though not going as 
far in their coverage48—are substantially similar to it in language, purpose, and effect.  At the time 
of its passage, just under three decades ago, CEPA was the most comprehensive whistleblower 
statute in the nation, serving as a frontrunner in the field of employee protection.49  In the years 
since its passage, many other states have enacted similar legislation.50  In interpreting this 
legislation, as will be detailed below, the courts of some of these other states have reached contrary 
results on the status of watchdog employees.51  In Lippman, the New Jersey Supreme Court missed 
an opportunity to more fully enunciate the strong public policy rationale for including watchdog 
employees under whistleblower protection statutes.  While such a discussion would not have added 
clarity or ease to the application of the decision within the state, it would have expanded its efficacy 
for other states wishing to look to New Jersey in interpreting their own statutes. 
III. States Where Whistleblower Protection Has Been Constricted 
 A.  Minnesota 
 In 1987, Minnesota’s legislature created a whistleblower statute intended to discourage 
illegal conduct by employers, encourage whistleblowing activity, and provide employees 
engaging in such activity with some protection.52  This statute, the Minnesota Whistleblower Act 
(MWA), provides that: 
                                                 
48 See Dellatore, supra note 26, at 377 (describing CEPA as “one of the broadest whistleblower statutes in the 
country when it was enacted and . . . still one of the most expansive”). 
49 Lippman, 75 A.3d at 451. 
50 See, e.g., Marshall H. Tanick, Blow the Whistle, Sound the Drum, 63 BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2006, at 18, 20 
(discussing that “[a]ll 50 state jurisdictions and the District of Colombia now recognize whistleblower rights . . . 
usually . . . based on ‘public policy’ grounds . . . or statutory provisions”). 
51 See generally Nancy M. Modesitt, The Garcetti Virus, 80 U. CINN. L. REV. 137, 162–77 (2011) (outlining the 
growth of the job duty exception to state whistleblower statutes since 2006). 
52 See Steven Andrew Smith et al., The Canary Sings Again: New Life for the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, 70 
BENCH & B. MINN., Sep. 2013, at 14, 15 (describing some of the “self-evident” purposes of the MWA as 
encouraging whistleblowing and “dissuad[ing] employers from engaging in, or continuing to engage in, illegal 
behavior”). 
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise 
discriminate against, or penalize an employee regarding the 
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges 
of employment because:  
(1) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an employee, in 
good faith, reports a violation, suspected violation, or planned 
violation of any federal or state law or common law or rule adopted 
pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law 
enforcement official. . .53 
 
Like New Jersey, the Minnesota legislature defined employee in an expansive way, providing that 
employee, for purposes of this section, “means a person who performs services for hire in 
Minnesota for an employer.”54  The use of the phrase “good faith” in this statute is the only notable 
difference between this language and the language of CEPA.55  The Minnesota courts have found 
that the legislature’s inclusion of this phrase requires analysis of whistleblower claims to consider 
the purpose and intent of the purported whistleblower.56  The path the courts took to reach this 
conclusion is worth detailing. 
 1.  The Good Faith Requirement 
The importance of the “good faith” language first came to light in Obst v. Microtron, Inc.57  
In that case, the plaintiff, Michael Obst, asserted that he had been terminated due to his reporting 
activity and sought a remedy under the whistleblower statute.58  Obst’s employer Microtron, was 
                                                 
53 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932 (West 2013). 
54 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.931 (West 2013). 
55 2013 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 83 (West 2013).  In a 2013 amendment, the Minnesota legislature added a definition 
to § 181.931 reading, “‘Good faith’ means conduct that does not violate section 181.932, subdivision 3.”  MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 181.931 (West 2013).  This subdivision, § 181.932, in turn, reads “False disclosures.  This section 
does not permit an employee to make statements or disclosures knowing that they are false or that they are in 
reckless disregard of the truth.”  Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.932 (West 2013).  This change will be discussed further 
below. 
56 Obst v. Microtron, Inc. 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000) (“In order to determine whether a report of a violation 
or a suspected violation of law is made in good faith, we must look not only at the content of the report, but also at 
the reporter’s purpose in making the report.”). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 199 (“Obst believed that . . . the actual reason [for his termination] was the fact that he reported what he 
thought were violations of law to Microtron.”). 
a manufacturer of wiper blades for Ford Motor Company.59  According to its contract with Ford, 
Microtron was required to quality test the wiper blades, using multiple machines to do so, prior to 
shipping them to the Ford assembly plants.60  Obst complained to his superiors that one of the 
testing machines was not functioning and that, as a result, faulty wiper blades were being shipped 
on to Ford.61  Microtron eventually addressed the problem, but not until after Ford had voiced its 
own concerns over the quality of the wiper blades it had been receiving.62  Shortly thereafter, Obst 
was terminated.63  This termination was purportedly for Obst’s inability to effectively 
communicate with peers, despite having recently received a raise and universally positive 
performance reviews.64  Obst alleged that he had been terminated for complaining about the 
company’s deviation from their quality control plan with Ford.65 
 Ultimately, Obst’s complaints either covered violations that were already generally known, 
or did not involve a violation of any law or regulation, and so the court found that Obst was not 
covered by the MWA.66  In arriving at this conclusion, the court discussed the meaning of the 
phrase “good faith” in the whistleblower statute for the first time.67  The court described the good 
faith analysis as a “critical question,” going on to provide clarity on what the question was, stating 
“we must look not only at the content of the report, but also at the reporter's purpose in making the 
report.”68  To support this contention, the court did not cite any Minnesota case law.  Instead, the 
                                                 
59 Id. at 198–99. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 199. 
62 Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 199. 
63 Id. (noting that, “[o]n June 1, 1995, Microtron terminated Obst’s employment,” about three and a half months 
after Ford first voiced concerns about the wiper blade quality “[o]n or about February 17, 1995”). 
64 Id. 
65 See supra note 58. 
66 Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 204. 
67 See Smith, supra note 52, at 15 (explaining that “[t]he narrow interpretation of ‘good faith’ began when courts 
held that whistleblowers had to prove they were ‘blowing the whistle’ for the ‘purpose of exposing an illegality,’” 
and citing to Obst). 
68 Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202. 
court relied on a district court case from Michigan.69  This was the only support offered to elucidate 
the content of the “critical question” and to establish that a whistleblower’s purpose is of 
paramount importance. 
 The court’s reliance on Wolcott was misguided, because Wolcott’s facts are distinguishable 
from those of Obst.70  In Wolcott, the plaintiff did not merely fail to establish that his reports were 
made in “good faith.”71  Rather, the court found that the plaintiff was foreclosed from receiving 
protection under Michigan’s whistleblower statute because of his own bad faith actions.72  Wolcott 
involved a heavy machinery maintenance mechanic who became disgruntled following an 
announcement from his employer that operations would be scaled back.73  Concerned about his 
and his coworkers’ job security, Wolcott sent his employer a threatening letter, warning that if he 
or his friends were to lose their jobs, he would expose a record of unlawful conduct in which his 
employer had engaged.74  The court refused to extend whistleblower protection to Wolcott, stating 
that it could not reward use of the whistleblower statute in a purely offensive way by a bad faith 
actor.75  This is very different than the reporting activity in which Mr. Obst engaged.  Mr. Obst’s 
reporting activity was done in the interest of motor vehicle safety, and compliance with federal 
regulations;76 at no time did he attempt to blackmail his employer.  The Michigan court’s 
discussion of a good faith whistleblower was meant as a juxtaposition to the bad faith conduct in 
which Wolcott engaged, not to support a searching analysis of the whistleblower’s purpose at the 
time he made the report. 
                                                 
69 Wolcott v. Champion Int’l Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1052 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1065. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1054. 
74 Id. at 1055. 
75 Wolcott, 691 F. Supp. at 1065. 
76 Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 201 (Minn. 2000). 
 The Minnesota court in Obst described the holding in Wolcott as standing for the 
proposition that a whistleblower’s burden is not met “where the purpose of the employee, at the 
time of the making of reports, was not to protect the public, but to protect the jobs of himself and 
his co-workers.”77  This ignores the fact that Wolcott was not merely foreclosed from protection 
because his purpose was not to protect the public, but rather because he engaged in bad faith, 
extortive behavior that ran directly contrary to the public policy goals served by whistleblower 
protection.  The court in Obst also refers to the Wolcott court holding that “the good faith 
requirement of the whistle-blower statute was not met.”78  This is curious because, as in CEPA, 
the Michigan statute in question contains no “good faith” language.79 
 2.  Ramifications of the Strained Reading of Wolcott in Obst 
 The majority in Obst seemed to create a new purpose element to a whistleblower claim, 
one which the dissenting judge in that case stated had never before been adopted and was not 
mandated by the language of the statute.80  Justice Gilbert went on to question the propriety of a 
panel of judges overturning a jury verdict based upon a contrary finding of fact.81  This purpose 
element, nevertheless, took on the “crucial question” status that the majority had ascribed it and 
led courts to perform searching analyses of the subjective intent of purported whistleblowers.82  
This line of cases developed the theory that if one’s job requires one to make a report, simply 
                                                 
77 Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202. 
78 Id. 
79 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.362 (West 2016). 
80 Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 206 (Gilbert, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. 
82 See generally Gee v. Minn. State Colls. and Univs., 700 N.W.2d 548, 555-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (faculty 
advisor did not have purpose to expose illegality when the sole purpose of her action was to fulfill the 
responsibilities of her job); Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass’n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1140-41 (D. Minn. 2005) (financial 
officer did not have purpose to expose illegality when responsibilities of his job required him to report any 
discrepancies in accounting). 
fulfilling that responsibility would not be enough to establish the requisite purpose which the 
statute required.  This theory was given explicit approval in the case of Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc.83 
 In Kidwell, the plaintiff worked as in-house council for the defendant company and filed a 
series of reports highlighting some concerning practices, urging that his employer stop engaging 
in them.84  Specifically, Kidwell made allegations that Sybaritic was engaged in tax evasion, the 
unlawful practice of medicine, and obstruction of justice.85  Three weeks later, he was terminated.86  
Kidwell’s stated purpose in alerting his employer of his perceived violations of law were to “pull 
th[e] company back into compliance” and, thereby, to ensure that further violations of law did not 
occur.87  Despite this laudable motive, and Kidwell’s good faith action in attempting to rectify the 
situation, the court held that he was excluded from whistleblower protection because his purpose 
was not to blow the whistle on the activity, but merely to do his job.88  Simply put, the court 
decided that when an employee is fulfilling the responsibilities of his job, he is not acting with the 
necessary purpose to blow the whistle, which the statute requires.89 
 In reaching this conclusion, the plurality stated that a blanket “job duties” exception could 
not apply to the statute, as it does not contain any limiting language in the inclusive definition of 
“employee.”90  Despite this, the plurality went on to say that, while the legislature had not defined 
“good faith” within the statute, it would apply the purpose analysis developed in Obst.91  Engaging 
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in this analysis, the plurality explained that whether the reporting activity fell within the 
employee’s job duties was a relevant consideration of the employee’s subjective intent, or purpose, 
in making the report.92  This amounts to an end-around.  Unable to bar a class of employees from 
whistleblower protection outright, the court developed a methodology under which that class 
would be effectively barred.   
For further support of this interpretation of the statutory language at issue, the court looked 
to how the federal courts had interpreted a substantially similar federal statute, the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989 (“WPA”).93  This statute provided federal employees with similar 
whistleblower protections to that of the MWA.  The court stated that in the past, it had found 
analysis of the WPA instructive to its analysis of the MWA.94  The court focused on two cases in 
particular which analyzed the WPA and found that, when reporting was made as part of an 
employee’s job duties, their level of protection was reduced.95  These two cases developed the 
existence, within the WPA, of a limited implied job duties exception.  Specifically, the “normal 
channels” of reporting language came from the court in Huffman, which the Minnesota court 
extended to their analysis of the state statute.96 
The language of Minnesota’s whistleblower protection statute provides protection for an 
employee who reports violations to their employer and does not restrict which employees are 
entitled to protection.97  Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court held here that the only way 
Kidwell could have engaged in “good faith” whistleblowing activity—activity with the requisite 
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purpose—would be if he went outside of the “normal channels” through which his job duties 
required him to file reports.98  By placing a higher burden on watchdog employees like Kidwell, 
and by removing from them one of their statutorily afforded avenues of recourse, the court has 
frustrated the legislature’s broad remedial purpose in effecting the legislation.99 
Like the court in Obst, the Kidwell court was not unified.  The plurality opinion, discussed 
above, was joined by only three justices.  A concurrence was filed on behalf of one justice who, 
while agreeing that Kidwell was not entitled to protection, arrived at that conclusion on different 
grounds.100  Finally, a dissent was filed on behalf of three other justices.101  In this opinion, Justice 
Anderson expresses his disapproval of the weight that the plurality gave to the fact that a report 
was made as a part of the employee’s job duties, through the normal channels.102  While the 
dissenting justice acknowledged that good faith was required (agreeing with the holding in Obst) 
and that purpose and subjective intent were properly examined, he disagreed that the above 
consideration could be seen as dispositive of the issue.103  Rather, he would have held that an 
employee, such as Kidwell, was perfectly capable of reporting in good faith, despite having a duty 
to make those same reports.104  Justice Anderson would leave the question of whether the required 
subjective intent existed in the hands of the trier of fact, not handed down in a proclamation by a 
panel of judges.105  This approach to the question of the subjective intent of the reporter, and 
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whether or not he acted in good faith, is more in line with the Michigan court in Wolcott, and more 
in line with the broad remedial purpose of the legislation at issue. 
 3.  Impact of Kidwell on the Public Policy Goals of Whistleblower Protection 
 Quite clearly, carving this limited job duties exception out of Minnesota’s whistleblower 
statute frustrates the legislative intent and undercuts the public policy goals sought in its 
enactment.106  After this decision, employees in Minnesota, in positions similar to Kidwell’s, are 
placed in an unfortunate situation.107  On the one hand, they can report violations of laws or 
regulations to their employers through the normal channels established by the normal duties of 
their jobs.  Taking this course, however, leaves the employee vulnerable to retaliatory action by 
his employer.  The employers will not have to fear retribution for such retaliation because, under 
the Kidwell precedent, those employees did not engage in protected conduct.108  On the other hand, 
the employee can go outside of the normal channels and report the violations to the proper 
authorities, risking an uncomfortable employment relationship going forward. 
 Undoubtedly, there will be watchdog employees who take this latter course, justifying the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s approach (to some extent) and bringing to fruition the goals of the 
Minnesota legislature.  There is also no doubt, however, that many employees will not.  People are 
naturally self-interested, and a decision to report one’s employer to the authorities will be, in the 
judgment of many, contrary to that interest.109  It is a much safer course to not make waves, not 
                                                 
106 See Modesitt, supra note 51, at 156 (explaining that, when a job-duties exception to whistleblower protection 
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rock the boat, and not risk one’s livelihood.  The prospect of unemployment, even if accompanied 
by damages conferred by a successful civil suit, is daunting.  If the only avenue open to certain 
employees is taking violations to outside authorities, it stands to reason that many employees will 
not take that course.110 
 This is, clearly, in direct contradiction to the stated goals of a whistleblower protection 
statute.  The purpose of these statutes is to encourage employees to attempt to remedy violations 
committed by their employers by providing them with protection from retaliation.111  Instead, for 
employees who would not be inclined to go to outside authorities, the Kidwell precedent 
discourages employees from taking action.  If they were to do so, they would be vulnerable to 
retaliation and have no protection whatsoever.  By allowing watchdog employees the same level 
of protection as any other employee, and by allowing reports made in the course of one’s normal 
job duties to constitute protected disclosures, the broad remedial purpose of this type of legislation 
would be more fully realized.112 
 B.  Maine 
 In 1983, the legislature of Maine created a whistleblower statute that is substantially similar 
to that of Minnesota, both in language and purpose.  The statute, the Maine Whistleblower 
Protection Act (“MWPA”), provides, in pertinent part: 
1. Discrimination prohibited. No employer may discharge, threaten 
or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the 
                                                 
110 See generally Modesitt, supra note 51, at 159 (explaining that “most whistleblowers do not use external channels 
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employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges 
of employment because:  
A. The employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf 
of the employee, reports orally or in writing to the employer or a 
public body what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a 
violation of a law or rule adopted under the laws of this State, a 
political subdivision of this State or the United States;  
B. The employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf 
of the employee, reports to the employer or a public body, orally or 
in writing, what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a 
condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of 
that employee or any other individual . . .113 
 
Notably, Maine’s whistleblower protection statute also contains the “good faith” language present 
in the Minnesota statute.114  Originally, the courts in Maine had interpreted this good faith language 
to impart the traditional meaning, standing for the inverse proposition of bad faith.115  This is 
illustrated concisely in the following quote from Gammon v. Crisis Counseling Ctrs., Inc: “The 
law it cites on good faith is generally geared towards an assessment of whether the purported 
whistleblower made her complaints for the purpose of exposing illegal or unsafe practices.  The 
Court is unaware of a more precise standard.”116  This is exactly in line with the Michigan court’s 
analysis in Wolcott.  Thanks to the Minnesota Supreme Court in Kidwell, however, a more precise 
standard was injected into the MWPA just nine months later. 
In that subsequent case, the appellee cited Kidwell to argue that the MWPA should be 
interpreted similarly to how the MWA was in that case.117  Capalbo involved a commercial truck 
driver who alleged that, prior to his termination, he had made a number of complaints to his 
supervisors regarding his hours worked, which were allegedly in violation of various laws and 
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regulations.118  Specifically, Capalbo alleged that he was being under-compensated for overtime 
hours, and that he was working in excess of the maximum hours allowed for the type of work he 
was engaged in.119  Capalbo’s case was fatally flawed, however.  Although he had reported his 
concerns to his supervisors at Kris-Way Truck Leasing, they cursorily brushed him off and told 
him not to worry about it, which is exactly what he did.120  If Capalbo had refused to work in 
excess of the maximum hours allowed for commercial truck drivers and had continued to complain 
in the face of this instruction, then he may have been able to state a claim of protected disclosure.121  
However, the court never reached this possibility. 
 Although the court disposed of the whistleblower claim without deciding whether a job 
duties exception like the one found in Kidwell would apply, it did briefly discuss the issue.122  Kris-
Way urged the court to accept the Kidwell and Willis line of reasoning because it was Capalbo’s 
responsibility to keep track of his own “hours logs” and to make sure that he was not going over 
the statutory maximums.123  Accordingly, it argued that any reports that he made as to excessive 
hours were required in the normal course of his job and were made through the normal channels, 
thus aligning with the Minnesota precedent.124  The court recited the argument but rendered no 
decision as to its merit.125 
 Two years later, however, in a curious turn of events, Capalbo was used in Winslow v.  
Aroostook County to sustain the proposition that “the usual rule in Maine is that a plaintiff's reports 
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are not whistleblowing if it is part of his or her job responsibilities to make such reports.”126  
Indeed, in Winslow, Capalbo was the only case law interpreting the Maine statute offered to 
support this contention.  The court, in attempting to bolster the rationality of this “usual rule,” 
offered only that it “is also true elsewhere,” citing to Kidwell and Willis.127  In Winslow, the 
plaintiff, Dena Winslow, made and distributed a report at the express request of her employer, 
which detailed some compliance issues regarding the status of her employment.128  Winslow 
distributed the report to a wider audience than to which she was instructed, an action which upset 
her superiors, who viewed it as insubordination.129  She was subsequently terminated.130   
As in Capalbo, the court found that the plaintiff’s reporting activity simply did not 
constitute whistleblowing.131  This was because, although there were compliance issues, 
Winslow’s superiors were actively engaged in attempting to remedy them (evidenced in the fact 
that Winslow’s report was created and distributed at the express request of Winslow’s boss).132  
This alone would have been fatal to Winslow’s claim.  The court, however, decided to articulate 
that the “usual rule” in Maine is that an employee is not engaging in protected whistleblowing 
when performing job responsibilities.133  This usual rule, however, was based entirely on: 1) the 
Capalbo decision; and 2) the application of Kidwell and Willis (which in turn provided the sole 
basis for that very same Capalbo decision).134  While the results in these two cases would likely 
have been the same had no job responsibilities analysis been undertaken, the resulting precedent 
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that it created has the potential to injure watchdog employees in future litigation, foreclosing them 
from coverage under the MWPA.  In fact, that is precisely what has occurred.135  This shift in the 
analysis of whistleblower actions in Maine illustrates the invidious potential for rulings like 
Kidwell.  It also illustrates the concomitant importance for courts and legislatures to strongly and 
affirmatively state why the public policy supporting whistleblower protection requires that it be 
afforded to all employees equally. 
To its credit, however, the First Circuit recently clarified some of the language used in the 
Winslow decision in Harrison v. Granite Bay Care, Inc.136  In that case, the court explained that 
while the “usual rule” in Maine is that you are not a whistleblower if you make reports pursuant 
to job responsibilities, this is “far from holding” that watchdog employees are “wholly ineligible 
for statutory whistleblower protection.”137  While not an outright ban, the court did go on to say 
that “job duties may be relevant” to analyzing a whistleblower claim under the MWPA, but that 
such duties will not be “dispositive of the question”.138  Whether a report is made pursuant to job 
duties is “relevant” because it will speak to the employee’s “motivation” in making the report: 
whether they acted as a whistleblower or whether they were simply doing their job.139  While this 
is not a total victory, as many employees will have an uphill battle proving their subjective intent, 
this will presumably make it easier for them to make it past summary judgment—and in at least 
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one case already has.140  This series of events, and the course that Maine’s whistleblower law took 
between the Winslow and Granite Bay decisions, underscores the critical role that judicial clarity 
takes in shaping the law. 
IV. States That Extend Whistleblower Protection to Watchdog Employees 
Whistleblower protection statutes vary greatly state to state, both in their language and in 
how they have been interpreted, but “the unmistakable trend has been the broadening of protections 
for employees who blow the whistle.”141  With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that the 
majority of states that have addressed the issue of a potential job duties exception to their 
whistleblower statutes have declined to adopt such a standard.142  This is good news for employees, 
and should be troubling to those states that have ruled otherwise.  Below is a brief summary of 
how some of these states have addressed this issue. 
A. Michigan 
 As discussed above, protection under Michigan’s whistleblower statute (“Michigan 
WPA”) was not extended to Paul Wolcott because the court there determined that his reports 
were not made in “good faith.”143  This determination was not reached because Wolcott’s reports 
were made pursuant to his job duties, but rather because his reports were made in bad faith.144  
Naturally a bad faith actor should not be granted whistleblower protection, which is why courts 
have restricted the reach of the Michigan WPA, despite any statutory language referring to 
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reports made in good faith.145  As discussed above, however, it is perfectly consistent to exclude 
employees acting in bad faith from whistleblower protection while at the same time including 
employees who blow the whistle pursuant to their job duties.146 
 In fact, this is precisely how the courts have interpreted the Michigan WPA.  The 
Supreme Court of Michigan has clearly stated that the lack of any job duties exception or 
limitation within the language of the Michigan WPA “renders irrelevant whether the reporting is 
part of the employee's assigned or regular job duties.”147  Not only is there no job duties 
exception within the Michigan WPA, the reporter’s motivation in making a report is also “not 
relevant to the issue [of] whether a [reporter] has engaged in protected activity.”148  Even without 
any explicit direction from the legislature, the courts in Michigan have afforded the Michigan 
WPA the broad application that it was intended to enjoy. 
B. California 
 California’s general whistleblower statute is, likewise, applicable to all “employees,” on 
its face.149  Despite the lack of any supporting language in the California whistleblower 
protection statute (hereinafter “CWPA”) however, courts began to graft a job duties exception 
onto it, first by analogy to other whistleblower statutes in the case of Muniz v. UPS, Inc.150  Two 
years later, the Muniz decision was expanded upon by a California Court of Appeals in Edgerly 
v. City of Oakland, which held that performing one’s job duties cannot be considered protected 
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activity under the CWPA.151  In reaching this conclusion the court did not cite to the statute, or to 
any legislative history, to support its reasoning.  Nonetheless, as the statute did not instruct 
otherwise, the court was within its authority to interpret it in this manner. 
 However, this state of affairs did not last long.  During the 2013 session, the California 
legislature amended the CWPA to make clear that it was meant to apply to all employees, 
“regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee’s job duties.”152  With 
this change, California’s legislators made a strong statement to the judiciary that whistleblower 
protection under the CWPA is intended for all employees.  The message has been clearly 
received, with courts extending the reasoning to other whistleblower claims as well, such as 
wrongful discharge under the common law public policy tort.153  This is a perfect illustration of 
the power of legislative clarity. 
C. West Virginia 
 The West Virginia whistleblower protection act (“WVWPA”) instructs that, in order to 
be considered a whistleblower, an employee must make a report in “good faith.”154  Unsatisfied 
with this language, however, the West Virginia legislature went a step further and defined “good 
faith report” as one that the reporter believe is true and that “is made without malice or 
consideration of personal benefit.”155  By clarifying this potentially ambiguous language, the 
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West Virginia legislature ensured that no job duties exception would be attached to the statute 
where one was not intended.156 
 This was recently confirmed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the case 
of Taylor v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources.157  In that case, an employee 
was terminated after voicing her concerns over what she “believed to be errors or irregularities” 
in the process through which her employer was soliciting and procuring bids for an advertising 
campaign.158  Reversing a lower court’s order granting summary judgment on behalf of the 
defendant, the supreme court of appeals unequivocally announced that “our Whistle-blower Law 
contains no job duties exception.”159  However, the court went on to say that the definition of 
good faith makes it “implicit . . . that the purpose of a report . . . [is] germane to determining 
whether an employee has engaged” in protected activity.160  This illustrates how dangerous 
“good faith” language can be in the whistleblower context: even where it is explicitly defined, it 
will always invite inquiry into an employee’s subjective intent in making a report. 
D. Texas 
 Under the Texas whistleblower protection act (“TWPA”), in order for a report to 
constitute protected activity, it must be made “in good faith.”161  The legislature did not define 
good faith within the text of the statute, instead relying on the courts to interpret it broadly, in 
accordance with the treatment given to remedial statutes.162  Taking this approach, the Supreme 
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Court of Texas defined good faith expansively in Wichita County, Tex. v. Hart.163  The court 
explained that the good faith requirement contains both a subjective and an objective 
component.164  Therefore, in order to perform a protected activity, an employee has to make a 
report with the subjective belief that “the conduct reported was a violation of law,” and that 
belief needs to be objectively “reasonable” in light of the circumstances.165  Without any explicit 
direction from the legislature, the courts in Texas interpreted the “good faith” language to be 
synonymous, essentially, with the “reasonable belief” language from CEPA.166 
 With this in mind, it is little surprise that there is no job duty exception under the TWPA.  
This was addressed in Rogers v. City of Fort Worth, in which a Texas court of appeals held that 
the fact that an employee “made [a] report primarily in his role as an employee” did not mean 
that the report could not constitute protected activity.167  The court went on to discuss the 
Huffman decision (which found that the Federal WPA did contain a job duties exception) and 
declined to apply it, stating that “[t]his case is not governed by the WPA” and that the TWPA 
was intended to protect “employees who report a violation of law.”168  This is a great example of 
a state whistleblower statute having the effect it was designed to have: protecting employees 
from retaliation for their protected activities, regardless of who the employee is.169 
V. Congress Overrules the Federal Precedents 
 Validating the approach taken by the New Jersey court, and striking a serious blow at the 
foundation of Kidwell and its progeny, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection 
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Enhancement Act (“WPEA”) in 2012.170  Intended to strengthen and extend whistleblower 
protections, one of the most significant amendments dealt directly with the question of a job duties 
exception, limited or otherwise.171  The amendment provided: 
[I]f a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an 
employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection 
(b)(8) if any employee who has authority to take, direct others to 
take, recommend, or approve any personnel action with respect to 
the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or 
threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to 
that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.172   
 
Congress clearly disapproved of this job duties carve out and, accordingly, created positive 
legislation to ensure that it would no longer have any effect.173 
 This was made abundantly clear in the case of Day v. Department of Homeland Security.174  
In that case, the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) was confronted with the question of 
whether or not the WPEA could be applied retroactively to cases which were pending prior to the 
legislation’s effective date.175  The board found that, while Congress had not specifically attached 
retroactive effect, giving it such effect was warranted because the WPEA’s definition of what 
constituted a disclosure did not represent a substantive change of law and rather was merely a 
clarification.176  The board noted that where the WPA had been ambiguous and left the question 
of job duty disclosures open, “[t]he WPEA plainly resolves this ambiguity and explicitly provides 
that these types of disclosures are covered under the WPA.”177  Thus, rather than serving as a 
                                                 
170 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–199, 126 Stat. 1465–76 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
171 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(f)(2) (West 2014). 
172 Id. 
173 See Jessica Wang, Protecting Government Attorney Whistleblowers: Why We Need an Exception to Government 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1063, 1077–78 (Fall 2013) (describing the WPEA as “closing 
the loophole . . . which excepted disclosures made during the normal course of duties”). 
174 Day v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 119 M.S.P.R. 589 (M.S.P.B. 2013). 
175 Id. at 592.  
176 Id. at 598. 
177 Id. at 599. 
change in law subsequent to Huffman, the WPEA clarified the law and stated that Huffman and its 
progeny had misinterpreted and misapplied the WPA.  Accordingly, Huffman has been superseded 
by statute.178 
 This deals a serious blow to Kidwell, as well as to the evolving case law in Maine.  To the 
extent that the courts’ decisions rested on Huffman’s interpretation of the WPA, that support has 
vanished.  This leaves the Minnesota precedent on exceedingly shaky footing.  Obst now 
represents the only “good law” that supports Kidwell, and as noted above, Obst itself is only 
supported by a strained reading of Wolcott.179  Maine is left in an even more unsure state, as the 
only remaining support for its decisions is Kidwell.180  Perhaps more significantly then the 
disappearance of this support is what this change represents.  The WPEA is positive proof that the 
legislative intent behind the WPA was to protect employees making reports as a part of their job 
duties.  Of course, this makes perfect sense when one considers the broad remedial purposes that 
whistleblower protection are supposed to provide. 
 Despite this shift in the federal landscape, Kidwell and its progeny remains good law in 
Minnesota and in Maine.  This is clearly an issue for watchdog employees in those states who are 
left without the protection that whistleblower statutes are designed to provide.  They have a duty 
to report but, if their employer does not appreciate the contribution, they can feel free to retaliate 
without fear of retribution or reprisal.181  This paradigm exists to the detriment to communities and 
the public at large, where employer wrongdoing will be less frequently checked and their activities 
will be allowed to continue.182  Additionally, as one commentator pointed out, allowing a job duties 
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exception to whistleblower protection “creates potential for employer abuse . . . [s]pecifically, by 
drafting employees’ job descriptions to include a duty to report unlawful conduct,” thereby making 
it more difficult for that employee to contest retaliation based on such reports.183 
This is also problematic for watchdog employees in other states that have yet to decide this 
issue.  If and when such states do confront the issue, they will look to how other states have ruled 
for guidance.  This was illustrated by the way Maine addressed watchdog employees, citing 
Minnesota case law as a primary justification for its rulings.184  This will be especially true in states 
whose whistleblower statutes are worded similarly to the MWA and the MWPA and include “good 
faith” language.  These decisions, and the path that these states have taken, threaten to inspire 
courts in other states to create a similar rule and graft onto their state statutes a job duty exclusion 
as well.185  This is partly why it is so important for courts, like the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Lippman, to articulate not only why watchdog employees are covered under the plain language of 
whistleblower statutes, but also why affording whistleblower protection to watchdog employees 
comports with the purpose of such statutes in the first place.  By making bold, decisive statements 
of this kind, courts can provide other states with compelling justifications for rejecting job duty 
exclusions, despite interpreting statutes with slightly different language and articulation. 
VI. Garcetti, the Job Duties Exception, and the Attorney Whistleblower 
A job-duties exception exists in another closely related context, established in the case 
Garcetti v. Ceballos.186  In that case, the respondent was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles 
County who discovered some issues with an affidavit, which had been critical in obtaining a search 
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warrant in a pending case.187  Ceballos took great pains to bring this situation to the attention of 
his superiors and to have the case dismissed but, ultimately, the office proceeded with the 
prosecution.188  Subsequently, Ceballos suffered a number of negative employment actions, 
including a demotion and a transfer.189  Ceballos sued in district court claiming a violation of his 
free speech rights under the First Amendment, based on the precedent established by Connick v. 
Myers.190  While Ceballos was successful on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, he ultimately lost when 
the Supreme Court held that speech made pursuant to an employee’s normal job duties cannot be 
protected by the First Amendment.191  The Court explained that such speech merely constituted 
‘employee speech,’ not rising to the level of ‘citizen speech.’192 
A considerable amount of literature has been published discussing the holding in Garcetti 
and the potential for it to broadly impact government employees’ workplace protections, including 
claims made under whistleblower protection statutes.193  These concerns are misplaced for a couple 
of reasons.  First, whistleblower statutes were created with employee protection in mind, and serve 
as a response to “the vulnerability of the at-will employee.”194  Therefore, it makes sense for 
whistleblower statutes to be applied broadly to all, without certain types of employees excluded.  
The First Amendment, on the other hand, was not created in order to protect employees from their 
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government employers, but rather to protect all citizens from the government.195  The vastly 
different aims of these two sources of employee protection explains why they would not offer 
employees the same level of protection. 
Secondly, the Garcetti opinion itself essentially disclaimed the application of a job-duties 
exception to whistleblower statutes when it referred to such laws as one of the alternative means 
by which an employee such as Ceballos could find protection.196  While the dissent noted that this 
was unavailing for federal employees due to the Huffman decision, as noted above, Congress has 
since amended the WPA in order to provide the protection the majority referred to.197  Congress 
ensured that federal whistleblowing employees were protected, and the Court ensured that 
Constitutional claims made by such employees would be limited, thereby ensuring that the proper 
mechanism would be applied to such claims.  The majority wanted employees such as Ceballos to 
have recourse, they just believed that overly constitutionalizing the federal workplace was not the 
proper means to provide it. 
 This case, as well as the Kidwell case discussed above, dealt with attorney whistleblowers, 
which raises a challenging question for whistleblower protection statutes: should certain 
professions be treated differently due to concerns unique to their position?198  The attorney 
whistleblower presents two separate issues: (1) the conflict between disclosing violations of the 
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law or public policy and the duty of client confidentiality; and (2) the conflict between protecting 
an attorney from retaliatory discharge and the right for a person or corporation to discharge their 
attorney.199  Similar confidentiality concerns present themselves in the medical field as well.  
While these issues complicate the decision to blow the whistle for some employees, there is no 
reason to entirely exclude those employees from whistleblower protection.  The public benefits 
from having well placed employees blow the whistle, and this is no different where attorneys are 
concerned.200 
VII. Conclusion 
 Whistleblower protection statutes are designed to protect the public by incentivizing 
employees to speak up when they see their employers acting contrary to either the law or to the 
general public interest.  Employees, after all, are in many cases the best-situated individuals to see 
these actions and remedy them.201  In Lippman, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized and 
affirmed the principle that whistleblower statutes should be read broadly and inclusively, and 
should apply to all employees, with no restriction.  Doing this will ensure that the purpose of 
whistleblower protection will be best served.  Unfortunately for some watchdog employees, not 
all courts have ruled in this way and some states, like Maine and Minnesota, have seen an exclusion 
carved out of their whistleblower statues for such employees. 
 Going forward, state legislatures should amend their whistleblower statutes to positively 
confirm that they are meant to apply to all employees, watchdog or otherwise.  This will foreclose 
courts from creating exclusions like the ones currently in place in Minnesota and Maine.  Courts 
in those states should overrule the harmful precedents that have been created and, in doing so, 
                                                 
199 See Lobel, supra note 198 at 1245. 
200 See,  
201 See Modesitt, supra note 51, at 156. 
confirm the broad public policy justifications for why whistleblower protection exists in the first 
place.  Courts in other states should do so as well to add instructive force to their rulings.  
Ultimately, this will lead to a better-protected workforce, more accountable employers, and a 
public that is less negatively impacted by employer abuses. 
